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INTRODUCTION

Since Enron's implosion, an astounding string of accounting
scandals have stunned the securities markets. Global Crossing,
WorldCom, Adelphia, and a host of other companies have seen
plummeting share prices and SEC and criminal investigations.
Congress's reaction has been equally stunning and surprisingly
swift. It passed with near unanimity the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 (the "SOA" or the "Act"),' and President Bush quickly
signed it into law. The President billed the Act as one of the "the
most far-reaching reforms of American business practices since
the time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt." 2 While the SOA is
certainly lengthy, with eleven titles and nearly 150 pages of text,

t Visiting Professor, Columbia University School of Law; Associate Professor,
St. John's University School of Law. Michael Simons and John Barrett were
enormously helpful with respect to the criminal components of the Act, and Susan

Stabile provided helpful comments as well. John Di Bari provided excellent research
assistance. All errors are, of course, my own.
I Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
2 Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Signs Bill Aimed at Fraud in Corporations, N.Y.
TIMES, July 31, 2002, at Al.
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its importance and impact are far from certain.
This Article is not intended as a complete overview of the
Act; instead, it focuses primarily on those provisions designed to
deter securities fraud. Before analyzing whether Congress is
likely to achieve its deterrence goals with these reforms, three
more general comments about the Act are in order. Admittedly,
none fall into the category of stunningly original insights into
the legislative process, but they do appear to be considerations
that Congress ignored in its headlong rush to get tough on
corporate crime.
In fact, the first is simply that haste makes waste. The SOA
moved with lightening speed through the legislature and only
seemed to pick up momentum with the revelation of each new
accounting restatement. Unfortunately, the Act reflects that
speed.
The original bill that Senator Sarbanes sponsored
appears to have been, for the most part, well thought out. But as
the political firestorm increased and the Dow Jones Average
plunged, there was clearly a sense in Washington that Congress
had to do something (anything) and do it fast.3 And so in the end
a number of other pending bills were simply engrafted wholesale
onto the Sarbanes bill.
The result was, at a minimum, a disorganized law. For
example, the Act's criminal provisions are scattered randomly
over three separate titles. Separate provisions, such as those
directing the United States Sentencing Commission (the
"Sentencing Commission") to review sentencing guidelines for
fraud and obstruction offenses, seem largely duplicative. More
significantly, other aspects of the Act, especially the changes to
the statute of limitations for private securities claims, are
inconsistent with current law. 4 Other aspects of the Act, like the
new certification requirements, are internally inconsistent,
although at least not totally contradictory. 5 Legislation billed as
being this important deserved more careful attention.
Second, an election year is a poor time to overhaul a
complicated area like securities regulation. Politicians with

3 Richard A. Oppel, Jr., G.O.P. in Congress Moving Past Bush on Business
Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2002, at C4 (quoting Senator Phil Gramm as saying,
"In the environment we are in, virtually anything can pass," and that "[elverybody

is trying to outdo everybody else").
4 See infra Part III.
5 See infra Part II.A.2.
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their eyes on November ballots may opt for easy fixes that look
good in thirty-second television commercials rather than taking
the time to analyze the merits of proposed policy changes, a fact
that one congressman candidly acknowledged. 6 Much of the Act
simply follows headlines from Enron and other corporate
scandals, with little appreciation for whether those headlines
highlight systemic problems that need legislative attention.
Many other provisions, particularly the vaunted criminal
provisions, represent little more than political grandstanding
and are unlikely to have any real deterrent effect. In the effort
to show that it was doing something, Congress seemingly
ignored the efforts that the SEC, the self-regulatory
organizations, and others had already undertaken-efforts that
might make portions of the legislation unnecessary. 7 In other
words, there was little appreciation that markets still work and
can right themselves.
Third, as always, the devil is in the details. Many provisions
of the Act are simply delegations of authority to the SEC to
adopt rules.8 Often these involve areas in which the SEC or the
undertaken
had
already
self-regulatory
organizations
rulemaking initiatives, again raising the question of whether
legislation was truly necessary. 9 While the Act contains quite
specific rulemaking directives, in many areas the true effect of
the Act will not be known until regulations are drafted and in
6 Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Negotiators Agree on Broad Changes in Business Laws,
N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2002, at Al ("The bill reflects a 'stampede by members to get
something done, regardless of what it is, to cover them politically,' Representative
John Boelmer of Ohio, one of the Republican negotiators on the final bill, said
earlier today. 'Trust me,' he added, 'this isn't about policy.' ").
7 For example, the Act requires the SEC to adopt rules directing the national
securities exchanges to adopt rules that, among other things, require the audit
committee to be directly responsible for the appointment, compensation, and
oversight of the outside auditors. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301 (to be codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)(2)). Before the SOA was passed, the NYSE had proposed to make
virtually the identical amendment to its listing standards. N.Y. STOCK EXCH.,
CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY AND LISTING STANDARDS COMM. 13 (June 6, 2002),
availableat http://www.eoa.org/images/corp-govreport.pdf.
8 See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 307 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7245)
(delegating authority to SEC to promulgate rules requiring attorneys to report
certain improper or illegal activity to board of directors).
9 Compare Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 302 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7241)
(requiring SEC to promulgate rules requiring CEOs and CFOs to certify the issuer's
financial statements), with Certification of Disclosure in Companies' Quarterly and
Annual Reports, Exchange Act Release No. 46,079, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
9186,702, at 85,808 (proposed June 14, 2002) (same).
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place. Much of this rulemaking is required to be completed very
quickly, in most cases in substantially less than a year. To meet
these ambitious deadlines, the SEC will most likely have to rely
heavily on those pending rulemaking proposals. Again, the end
result may be that many provisions of the Act add very little to
the ongoing reform process.
To be sure, these criticisms do not apply to the entire Act.
Some of its provisions may well have a substantial and lasting
impact on our securities markets, although it is reasonable to
expect, as with other recent securities legislation, that
significant unintended consequences will arise. 10 In short, it is
far too early to proclaim the Act as the second coming of the New
Deal.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I briefly sketches the
economic theory of deterrence. Part II discusses the Act's new
criminal sanctions and penalties. Part III focuses on private
civil liability for securities fraud, primarily the new longer
statute of limitations for certain securities claims. Part IV
discusses the SOA provisions that increase SEC resources and
enforcement authority." Brief concluding remarks follow.
I. ECONOMIC THEORY OF DETERRENCE
Although deterrence theories can be traced back to Jeremy
Bentham's work in the late eighteenth century, Gary Becker is
generally credited with providing the first rigorous economic
model of crime and optimal penalties. 12
Since Becker's
pioneering 1968 article, a staggeringly large body of theoretical
10 See Michael A. Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
Work?, U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003).
11 Increased criminal penalties and more vigorous SEC enforcement are not the
only deterrence mechanisms the SOA creates. The Act also attempts to reinvigorate
various private monitoring mechanisms-ranging from the company's outside
auditors to audit committees, outside counsel, market analysts, and whistleblowers.
By enhancing these private monitoring mechanisms, the Act is seeking to increase
the likelihood that inappropriate or illegal activity will be detected. Some of these
provisions, for example those limiting the ability of the issuer's outside auditor to
provide non-audit consulting services, are attempts to eliminate conflicts that may
have prevented vigorous, independent monitoring. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 201 (to
be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1). Others, such as the requirement that counsel
report evidence of wrongdoing to the board of directors, represent potentially
substantial extensions of traditional roles. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 307 (to be
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7245).
12 See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J.
POL. ECON. 169 (1968).
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and empirical literature has emerged. 13 Like other economic
models, the crime model starts from the simple premise that
individuals are willing to commit crimes if the expected benefits
of the crime exceed the expected benefits of engaging in lawful
activity. 14 In other words, the decision to commit a crime is
simply another type of decision-making under conditions of
uncertainty. It thus involves the same kind of calculus that a
rational utility-maximizing individual would apply to the
decision to engage in any activity. In this model, penalties are
necessary for prohibited activities so that individuals internalize
the cost of those activities. 15
Specifically, under Becker's model the individual compares
the expected utility to be gained from engaging in risky criminal
behavior to that of riskless legitimate employment. 16 Three
components determine the expected utility from engaging in
criminal behavior-the subjective probability of being caught
and convicted, 17 the monetary equivalent of the punishment if
8
convicted, and the gain from committing the crime.'
Under this model, expected utility to the individual of
committing the crime is negative if, for example, the monetary
equivalent of the punishment is greater than the gain from

13 Broad overviews of this literature can be found in The Encyclopedia of Law
and Economics. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Public Enforcement of
Law, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & ECONOMICS 307 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit
de Geest eds., 2000); Erling Eide, Economics of Criminal Behavior, in 5
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & ECONOMICS, supra, at 345; John R. Lott, Jr., Corporate

CriminalLiability, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & ECONOMICS, supra, at 492.
14 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 242 (5th ed. 1998).
15 Michael K. Block, Optimal Penalties, Criminal Law and the Control of
CorporateBehavior, 71 B.U. L. REV. 395, 397 (1991).
16 This assumption, that acting legitimately is without risk, is obviously
problematic for the executive contemplating securities fraud. For example, suppose
that the executive knows that if he does not engage in accounting fraud, his
company will miss its forecasted earnings. That may result in a significant drop in
stock price, a significant decrease in the executive's compensation, possible loss of
employment, as well as loss of reputation. If these risks from legitimate activity are
added to the model, however, they do not materially affect the outcome. See DAVID

J. PYLE,. THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 11 (1983).
17 The individual's risk preference will play a role here. A risk-averse individual
would likely believe that detection and conviction were more likely than a riskpreferring individual.
18 Becker's model assumed that if caught and convicted, the criminal would
forfeit all gains from the crime. This may not be the case when it comes to corporate
criminals if they can effectively place their gains beyond the reach of enforcement
officials.
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committing the offense, but only if the probability of being
caught and convicted are sufficiently high. In other words,
expected utility can still be positive even for crimes with severe
punishments if the probability of detection and conviction are
low. Likewise, as the gains from criminal activity increase the
utility of criminal activity increases as well. 19 Quite clearly, an
increase in the loss if caught or an increase in the probability of
detection and conviction should reduce the expected utility of
criminal activity and also reduce the number of crimes. 20 The
normative question for legislatures looking to reduce the amount
of a particular type of crime is to choose the optimal mix of
enforcement resources (i.e., the risk of detection) and the
severity of punishment that maximizes social welfare. 21 The
SOA takes both approaches.
The SOA's primary deterrence mechanism comes in the form
of several new crimes and enhancements to existing criminal
sanctions. Indeed, most press attention on the SOA has centered
on these aspects of the Act. Politicians have also trumpeted the
Act's tougher criminal penalties-when President Bush signed
the SOA he claimed that there would be "[n]o more easy money
for corporate criminals, just hard time."22 But will these
provisions really deter fraudulent conduct? A careful analysis of
what these provisions actually do and application of the lessons
from deterrence theory suggest that these provisions are
unlikely to have much deterrent effect.
II.
A.

CRIMINAL SANCTIONS & PENALTIES UNDER THE

SOA

New Crimes
Some things are inevitable. The sun rises in the morning,

19 See Michael K. Block & Robert C. Lind, An Economic Analysis of Crimes
Punishableby Imprisonment, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 479, 486 (1975).
20 See PYLE, supra note 16, at 13.
21 Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 13, at 309; see also JAMES Q. WILSON &
RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN, CRIME AND HUMAN NATURE 397 (1985) ("To increase the

expected disutility of crime for people in general, society must increase either the
speed, the certainty, or the severity of punishment, or some combination of all
three."). There has been little if any research "that estimates the effect of changes in
the speed of punishment on the probability of crime." Id. at 397. Such a connection
is, however, intuitively plausible. See id. at 49-56 (analyzing the interaction of
delay and uncertainty).
22 Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Signs Bill Aimed at Fraud in Corporations,N.Y.
TIMES, July 31, 2002, at Al.
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the tides ebb and flow, and Congress passes new crime
legislation in an election year.23 So we should not be surprised
that this year's version of the crime bill focuses on the recent
parade of corporate scandals. When scandals erupt or horrific
crimes capture public attention, Congress wants to show that it
is doing something about it. There is a long and sometimes
ignominious history in Congress of either federalizing crimes
that were typically subject to state jurisdiction or addressing
public outcry over some recent event through new criminal laws,
often in areas in which there appeared to be little need for new
federal legislation. 24 When stories about a new "date-rape" drug
hit the press, 25 Congress responded with a new federal crime
prohibiting drug-induced rape. 26 Congress has even turned car27
jacking into a federal crime.
Given the public outcry over seemingly widespread
corporate malfeasance, it is easy to see why politicians would
want to demonstrate that they are just as tough on corporate
crime as they are on street crime. Politicians have competed
over who was the most willing to put CEOs "in the pokey. '28 As
debate in Congress over the SOA intensified, one representative
even quipped, "Summary executions would get about 85 votes in
the Senate right now." 29 While this year's batch of new corporate
crimes does not raise the federalism concerns of past
23 See Michael A. Simons, ProsecutorialDiscretion and Prosecution Guidelines:
A Case Study in Controlling Federalization, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 893, 906 (2000)
("Since 1984, every national election year has seen the creation of new federal
crimes.").
24

See id. at 902-07. See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND

PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 71-73, 134-39, 261-76, 339-41 (1993).
25 See, e.g., David Kidwell & Connie Piloto, Parents, Officials Are Alarmed Over
Sedative's Use: Roofies' Blamed in Many Rape Cases; Hypnotic Drug Hard to Trace,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 18, 1996, at 12A; Jean Seligmann & Patricia King,
'Rooftes': The Date-Rape Drug, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 26, 1996, at 54.
26 Drug-Induced Rape Prevention and Punishment Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104305, 110 Stat. 3807 (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
27 See Anti-Car Theft Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-519, 106 Stat. 3384 (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2119, 2322).
28 See Stephen Labaton, Handcuffs Make Strange Politics, You Say? But Not in
Washington, NY TIMES, Aug. 2, 2002, at C5 (quoting White House Press Secretary
Ani Fleischer as saying, "The president is determined that people who break
America's laws and engage in corporate practices that are corrupt will be
investigated and will be held liable, will be held accountable and will likely end up
in the pokey, where they belong").
29 Richard A. Oppel, Jr., G.O.P. in Congress Moving Past Bush on Business
Fraud,NY TIMES, July 12, 2002, at C4 (quoting Rep. Michael G. Oxley).
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congressional lawmaking efforts, there are serious questions
about the manner in which these provisions were drafted and
whether they substantially increase deterrence of corporate
wrongdoing. By and large the new criminal provisions address
two hot-button issues-obstruction of justice and securities
fraud.30
1.

Obstruction of Justice
With an eye clearly on the Arthur Andersen document
destruction prosecution, 3 1 Congress created three new
obstruction-related offenses, which appear in two different titles
of the SOA. Section 1102 of the SOA amends 18 U.S.C. § 1512 to
create a maximum twenty-year sentence for efforts or attempts
to tamper with records or otherwise obstruct official
proceedings. 32 Section 802 of the SOA contains the other two
new obstruction statutes.
Under new 18 U.S.C. § 1519,
individuals that knowingly destroy, alter, or falsify records "with
the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence" a federal
investigation or bankruptcy proceeding are subject to fines and
potential imprisonment of up to twenty years. 33 The second
30 The Act also prohibits retaliation against informants. Any individual that
takes a harmful action against any person in retaliation for that person "providing
to a law enforcement officer any truthful information relating to the commission or
possible commission of any Federal offense" is subject to fines and imprisonment of
up to ten years. Sarbanes-Oxley Act §1107 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e) (2000)).
31 See Ken Brown et al., Paper Trail: Andersen Fires Partner It Says Led
Shredding Of Enron Documents, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 2002, at Al.
32 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 1102 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)). The section
provides:
Whoever corruptly-(1) alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record,
document, or other object, or attempts to do so, with the intent to impair
the object's integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding; or (2)
otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or
attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than 20 years, or both.
Id.
33 Id. § 802(a) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1519). This section, entitled
"destruction of records in federal investigations and bankruptcy proceedings,"
provides:
Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up,
falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object
with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper
administration of any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or
agency of the United States or any case filed under title 11, or in relation
to or contemplation of any such matter or case, shall be fined under this
title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.
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provision relates to the destruction of corporate audit paper and
mandates accountants that conduct audits required under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act") to
maintain all audit or review workpapers for five years. 34
Individuals
that knowingly and willfully violate this
requirement, or any rule or regulation promulgated thereunder,
are subject to fines and potential imprisonment of up to ten
years.

35

One of the more glaring examples of the SOA's drafting
problems is this document retention requirement. In Title One
of the SOA, Congress established a new self-regulatory
organization for the accounting industry-the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (the "Board"). 36 In delegating
authority to the Board to establish accounting standards,3 7 the
Act directs the Board to require accountants to maintain audit
workpapers for seven, not five, years. 38 Reading these provisions
together suggests that an auditor that willfully destroys
workpapers in years six and seven is only subject to disciplinary
action by the Board or enforcement action by the SEC, but not
criminal prosecution under this new provision. Of course the
Id.
34 Id. (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1520(a)(1)). Additionally, the SEC is
required to promulgate rules and regulations:
[Rielating to the retention of relevant records such as workpapers,
documents that form the basis of an audit or review, memoranda,
correspondence, communications, other documents, and records (including
electronic records) which are created, sent, or received in connection with
an audit or review and contain conclusions, opinions, analyses, or financial
data relating to such an audit or review.
Id. (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1520(a)(2)).
35 Id. (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1520(b)).
36 Id. § 101(a) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7211).
37 Id. Specifically, the Board, subject to SEC oversight, is required to: (i)
register public accounting firms that prepare audit reports for "reporting
companies"; (ii) establish auditing, quality control, ethics, and independence
standards for audits; (iii) inspect registered public accounting firms; (iv) conduct
investigative and disciplinary proceedings of public accounting firms and associated
persons; (v) enforce compliance with the SOA, the Board's rules, professional
standards, and the securities laws relating to the preparation and issuance of audit
reports; and (vi) promote high professional standards and improve the quality of
audit services. Id. § 101(c).
38 The legislative history of § 1520 recognizes this inconsistency, but does not
explain why the time periods applicable under these two provisions are different.
See 148 CONG. REC. S7419 (daily ed. July 26, 2002) (discussing five-year retention
period in criminal statute and noting "regulatory portion of the Act requires a 7 year
retention period").
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auditor might, depending on the context, still be criminally liable
under existing obstruction provisions. And that is the pointlike other recent federal crime legislation, these new crimes do
very little to criminalize conduct that was not already criminal.
To be sure, it is possible to read these provisions much more
broadly. Indeed, one could easily view them as significant
extensions of obstruction law. For example, new §§ 1512(c) and
1519 allow actions against individuals that knowingly obstruct
justice, not just those who corruptly persuade or intimidate
others to do so. 39 Second, unlike § 1512, § 1519 has no "official
proceeding" requirement. 40 As a result, § 1519 could cover any
document destruction involving any matter within the
Senator Leahy, who was
jurisdiction of a federal agency.
primarily responsible for drafting § 1519, has argued that it
"imposes broad prohibitions on evidence tampering" beyond
41
those found in current law.
But how significant are these changes? Simple proof issues
dictate that most obstruction cases are likely to involve more
than one individual. For example, if I secretly shred a document
in my possession, how likely is it that the government would
ever have sufficient evidence to convict me? Courts have broadly
defined corrupt persuasion to encompass a wide variety of
activities, including non-coercive attempts to tamper with
witnesses. 42 Thus, finding a corrupt persuader may not present
significant difficulties for a prosecutor. Likewise, under § 1512,
"official proceedings" are broadly defined and need not be
pending at the time of the offense. 43 While § 1519 technically
applies to the destruction or alteration of documents in violation
of any federal regulatory function, it is unlikely, both as a matter
of prosecutorial discretion and of proving criminal intent, that
indictments will involve tampering that is not at least in
contemplation of an investigation. Finally, it is worth noting
that the Justice Department did not petition Congress for these
changes.
If the Justice Department saw real loopholes in
39 See 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) (2000); see also United States v. Khatami, 280 F.3d
907, 911-14 (9th Cir. 2001).
40 18 U.S.C. § 1519.
41 See Letter from Sen. Leahy to Attorney General Ashcroft (Aug. 5, 2002).
42 See, e.g., Khatami, 280 F.3d at 912-13 (citing additional cases).
43 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(f)(1), 1515(a)(1); see also United States v. Davis, 183
F.3d 231, 248 (3d Cir. 1999); United States v. Frankhauser, 80 F.3d 641, 652 (1st
Cir. 1996).
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existing statutes, it is reasonable to anticipate that it would be
first to lobby for reforms. Thus, as a practical matter, it seems
that these provisions criminalize very little new conduct and
therefore carry very little, if any, additional deterrence benefit.
2.

Securities Fraud

The same criticisms apply to the new securities fraud crime.
Securities fraud has been a federal crime since 1933. 44 Both the
Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities Act") and the Exchange
Act make it a criminal offense to willfully violate any of their
provisions or any SEC rules promulgated thereunder. 45 In
addition, the Exchange Act criminalizes false filings if they are
46
made willfully and knowingly.
The new provision is intended to make it easier to win a
securities fraud prosecution and is modeled on the mail and wire
fraud statutes, 47 as well as more recent provisions aimed at bank
and health care fraud. 48 Under new 18 U.S.C. § 1348, any
individual who knowingly executes or attempts to execute a
scheme or artifice: (i) to defraud any person in connection with
any security of a registered or reporting company; or (ii) to
obtain by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises any money or property in
connection with the purchase or sale of any registered or
reporting company is subject to fine and imprisonment up to
49
twenty five years.
This provision probably does make it marginally easier to
prosecute individuals for securities fraud than would be true
under Rule 10b-5 because it eliminates a number of elements. 50
See 15 U.S.C. § 77x.
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77x, 78ff.
Id. § 78f(a).
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343.
48 See id. §§ 1344, 1347.
49 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 807(a) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1348).
50 See 148 CONG. REC. S7421 (daily ed. July 26, 2002):
This bill, then, would create a new 25 year felony for securities fraud-a
more general and less technical provision comparable to the bank fraud
and health care fraud statutes in Title 18.... The provision should not be
read to require proof of technical elements from the securities laws, and is
intended to provide needed enforcement flexibility in the context of
publicly traded companies to protect shareholders and prospective
shareholders against all the types [sic] schemes and frauds which
inventive criminals may devise in the future.
44
45
46
47
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For example, a prosecution under this new provision would not
require proof of fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of
a security. 5 1 The statute may also make it marginally easier for
prosecutors to present their case to the jury because, unlike mail
and wire fraud, the name of the crime now matches the
underlying offense. Nonetheless, it is unclear how much benefit
this provision really provides prosecutors or how much it really
increases the odds of obtaining a conviction. Prosecutors have
typically relied heavily on the mail and wire fraud statutes to
address securities fraud, and there is no indication that juries
were reluctant to convict defendants under those provisions.
The real difficulty prosecutors have always had in complex
corporate fraud cases is proving criminal intent-something the
new securities fraud statute does nothing to change.
Some of the same criticisms can be made with respect to
section 906 of the SOA, which requires CEOs and CFOs of
reporting companies to certify in writing for each periodic report
containing financial statements that the report fully complies
with the requirements of section 13(a) and 15(d) of the Exchange
Act and that "information contained in the periodic report fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of the issuer."52 Officers that certify
statements knowing that the periodic reports do not comport
with all these requirements are subject to fines of up to $ 1
53
million and potential imprisonment of up to ten years. Willful
violations increase the maximum penalties to $5 million and
54
twenty years.
While the certification requirement is new, CEOs or CFOs
that make knowingly false certifications would have been subject
to prosecution for making false statements to the federal
government without section 906. 5 5
Section 906 is another
instance of the hurried drafting of the SOA. The primary
certification requirements of the Act are contained in Title III,

51 See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651 (1997). The new securities
fraud provision is in other ways narrower than Rule 10b-5. Rule 10b-5 applies to
any security, whereas the new statute applies only to the securities of reporting

companies.
52 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 906 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1350(a), (b)).
53 Id. (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1350(c)(1)).
54 Id. (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1350(c)(2)).
5518 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2000).
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and require more extensive certifications by the signing officer.5 6
Any willfully false certification on these other aspects would still
be criminal, but prosecution would be for making a false
statement and not under the SOA.
The novel aspect of the criminal certification provision is not
that it criminalizes false statements, but rather it is in the
nature of the certification itself. Executives are not required to
certify that the financial statements comply with GAAP-they
must certify that they fairly present the issuer's financial
condition and results of operations.
Conceivably, financials
could paint a misleading picture of the financial condition of the
issuer even if they comply with GAAP. Any executive that
knowingly signed a certification under these circumstances could
be criminally liable. The effect of this provision is to codify
Judge Friendly's decision in United States v. Simon,57 which held
that an accountant could be convicted of securities fraud even if
the accounting practice at issue complied with GAAP.58
It is difficult to predict the long-term effect of this
codification, but it is possible that Congress may have indirectly
worked a significant change in accounting doctrine. In essence
this criminal provision may move United States accounting
policy away from its traditional rule-based focus to the more
standard-based focus of European accounting rules.5 9 While a
56 Section 302 directs the SEC to promulgate rules requiring CEOs and CFOs
to certify the issuer's quarterly and annual reports. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 302
(to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7241). Pursuant to this directive, SEC rules now
require these officers to certify the following:
[That] they are responsible for establishing, maintaining and regularly
evaluating the effectiveness of the issuer's internal controls; they have
made certain disclosures to the issuer's auditors and the audit committee
of the board of directors about the issuer's internal controls; and they have
included information in the issuer's quarterly and annual reports about
their evaluation and whether there have been significant changes in the
issuer's internal controls or in other factors that could significantly affect
internal controls subsequent to the evaluation.
Certification of Disclosure in Companies' Quarterly and Annual Reports, 67 Fed.
Reg. 57,276 (Sept. 9, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 232, 240, 249,
270, 274).
57 425 F.2d 796, 798 (2d Cir. 1969).
58 Even in Simon, however, the court was careful to observe that compliance
with GAAP is persuasive although not necessarily conclusive proof that the
defendant acted with good faith. Id. at 805-06.
59 See Accounting and Investor Protection Issues Raised by Enron and Other
Public Companies:Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban
Affairs, 107th Cong. (2002) (prepared statement of Sir David Tweedie, Chairman,
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number of commentators argue that such a shift in United
States accounting policy is warranted, serious questions abound
as to whether criminal law provides the appropriate vehicle for
60
doing so.
B.

Enhanced CriminalPenalties

In addition to creating new crimes, the SOA beefs up the
penalties for certain existing crimes. Maximum penalties for
mail and wire fraud are increased from five to twenty years. 61
Section 902(a) provides that any person who attempts or
conspires to commit mail, wire, securities, or any other fraud
shall be subject to the same penalties as for a substantive
violation of those provisions. 62 Maximum criminal penalties
under the Exchange Act are increased for individuals from fines
of $1 million and imprisonment of ten years to fines of $5 million
and imprisonment of twenty years. 63 Fines for organizations are
increased from $2.5 million to $25 million. 64
Section 904
increases penalties for criminal ERISA violations.
For
individuals, the maximum sentence is increased from one to ten
years, and maximum fines are increased from $5,000 to
$100,000. For organizations, maximum fines are increased from
$100,000 to $500,000.65
A number of provisions of the SOA direct the Sentencing
Commission to review and amend the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines (the "Sentencing Guidelines"), where appropriate. 66
Like the other criminal provisions, these directives are scattered
throughout the SOA and are often duplicative. The Sentencing
Commission must review whether "the base offense level and
existing enhancements ... relating to obstruction of justice are
sufficient." 67 In addition, it is required to review several aspects
Int'l Accounting Standards Bd.).
60 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and
Civil Law Models-And What Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875, 1881-82
(1992).
61 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 903 (amending 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343).
62 Id. §902(a) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 1349).
63 Id. § 1106 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a)).
64

Id.

Id. § 904 (amending 29 U.S.C. § 1131).
The Sentencing Commission is directed to complete this review not later
than 180 days after the SOA was enacted. Id. § 805(b).
67 Id.
§ 805(a)(1). This review includes an assessment of whether the
enhancements and specific offense characteristics are adequate for cases in which
65
66
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of sentencing related to fraud claims, 68 to review whether the
guidelines that apply to organizations are sufficient, 69 and to
engage in a more general review of the Sentencing Guidelines in
light of the new crimes added under the SOA and "the growing
70
incidence of serious fraud offenses."
These penalty enhancements seem unlikely to deter
corporate crime to any greater degree than current provisions.
One reason is because it is unlikely that these provisions
actually change expected penalties in criminal prosecutions.
Maximum statutory sentences play a relatively small role under
the Sentencing Guidelines-they simply set an outside limit to
the sentence a court may impose. 71 Consequently, even if a
guidelines calculation yields a maximum penalty of fifteen years,
a defendant convicted of crime with a statutory maximum of ten
years may only be sentenced to ten years. In practice, however,
prosecutors can easily evade that restriction.
They have
enormous flexibility to increase or decrease the potential
sentence through their charging and plea bargaining decisions
and can even exceed statutory maximums by charging multiple
counts. 72 So, if a prosecutor wanted to increase sentence length,
the obstruction involves the destruction of a large amount of evidence, or of
particularly probative or essential evidence, involved more than minimal planning,
or involved an abuse of a special skill or position of trust. Id. § 805(a)(2). The
Sentencing Commission must also review whether the guideline offense levels and
enhancements are sufficient for cases in which documents or other physical
evidence is actually destroyed, id. § 1104(b)(4), and for the new obstruction-related
crimes (destruction of records in federal investigations and bankruptcies and
destruction of corporate audit records), id. §§ 802, 805(a)(3).
68 The Sentencing Commission is directed to ensure that (i) sentencing
guidelines and policy statements "reflect the serious nature of securities, pension,
and accounting fraud and the need for aggressive and appropriate law enforcement
action to prevent such offenses"; (ii) an enhancement exists for fraud offenses that
endanger the financial solvency or financial security of a substantial number of
victims; and (iii) guideline offense levels and enhancements are sufficient for fraud
offenses when the number of victims is significantly greater than fifty. Id. § 1104(b).
69 Id. § 805(a)(5).
70 Id. § 905(b).
71 U.S. SENTENCING

GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5G1.1(c)(1) (2002) [hereinafter

U.S.S.G.].
72 Under the U.S.S.G., if the defendant is convicted of multiple counts, then
sentences are required to run consecutively so that the combined sentences equal
the guidelines calculation. U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(d). For discussions of prosecutorial
discretion and its effect on Guideline determinations, see Stephen J. Schulhofer &
Ilene H. Nagel, Plea Negotiations Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines:
Guideline Circumvention and Its Dynamics in the Post-MistrettaPeriod, 91 NW. U.
L. REV. 1284 (1997).
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it would be relatively easy in most financial frauds to charge the
defendant with multiple counts of mail, wire, and securities
fraud.
White-collar crime was also one of the only areas in which
the drafters of the Sentencing Guidelines sought to increase the
severity of pre-Guidelines sentences.7 3 Indeed, one of the goals
was to send serious white-collar criminals to prison instead of
just giving them probation. 74 To some degree the drafters
achieved that goal-in post-Guidelines cases a greater
proportion of individual white-collar defendants serve prison
time
instead
of
probationary
sentences, 75
although
organizational fines do not appear to have increased
76
significantly.
In fraud cases, the key component to sentence length is the
financial harm the fraud caused.7 7 Large financial frauds, like
those that Congress focused on in the debate on the SOA,
already yield substantial prison terms.7 8 The enhancements that
Congress asked the Sentencing Commission to review add
comparatively little to those sentences. Oddly enough, they may
have their greatest impact not in large frauds like Enron, but in
smaller ones because they may mean the difference between
probation and jail time. 79 It also remains to be seen how much
73 U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A(3) (noting that empirical data demonstrated that
"economic crime" was punished "less severely than other apparently equivalent
behavior").
74 Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key
Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 22 (1988).
75 See Theresa Walker Karle & Thomas Sager, Are the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines Meeting CongressionalGoals?: An Empirical and Case Law Analysis, 40
EMORY L.J. 393, 416 (1991) (concluding that a greater proportion of white-collar
defendants were imprisoned but that prison terms had not increased). But see
Michael S. Gelacak et al., Departures Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines:An
Empirical and JurisprudentialAnalysis, 81 MINN. L. REV. 299, 352-53 (1996)
(finding that white-collar defendants benefited disproportionately from downward
departures from the sentencing guidelines).
76 Jeffrey S. Parker & Raymond A. Atkins, Did the Corporate Criminal
Sentencing GuidelinesMatter? Some PreliminaryEmpirical Observations, 42 J. LAW
& ECON. 423, 423 (1999).
77 See Frank 0. Bowman III, Coping with "Loss" A Re-Examination of
Sentencing Federal Economic Crimes Under the Guidelines, 51 VAND. L. REV. 461,
464 (1998).
78 U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1).
79 At the lowest levels of the Sentencing Guidelines, a two-point change in
offense level can move the defendant into a different "zone," which could significant
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the Guidelines will change as a result of the SOA.
The
Sentencing Commission has already reviewed much of what
Congress asked it to review in the SOA,80 and it seems unlikely
that another review will result in substantial changes to the
Guidelines.
More fundamentally, economic analyses of crime and
punishment strongly suggest that enhanced criminal penalties
like these do comparatively little to deter crime.8 ' In part this is
because complex white-collar crimes likely have a low probability
of detection. Even if they are detected, cases like the Andersen
obstruction trial teach that successful convictions are difficultonly increasingly so when it comes to complex financial crimes.
These low probabilities tend to swamp any increase in
deterrence from enhancing sanctions. For example, assume that
a defendant faced a ten percent chance of detection and
successful prosecution for securities fraud. Prior to the SOA,
securities fraud had a ten-year maximum sentence, which meant
that at most the defendant's expected sentence was one year.
The SOA doubled the maximum sentence to twenty years, but
assuming that the Act had no effect on the probability of
detection and successful prosecution, that ten-year maximum
sentence increase yields only a one-year increase in expected
sentence.
Another theoretical explanation for the relatively small
benefit from increasing punishment severity rests on the notion

change the defendant's conditions of confinement. See U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A, § 5CL..
If the defendant's offense level falls within Zone A (the lowest zone), the defendant
may be sentenced to probation. See id. § 5C1.1(b). In Zone B, the defendant may be
sentenced to home detention or a half-way house. See id. § 5C1.1(c). In Zone C, the
defendant must serve half of the sentence in prison, but may do the other half at
home or in a half-way house. See id. § 5C1.1(d). In Zone D, the defendant must serve
the entire sentence in prison. See id. § 5Cl.(f). Thus, the minimum sentence for a
defendant with a offense level of twelve is five months imprisonment and five
months home confinement. The minimum sentence or a defendant with a offense
level of fourteen is fifteen months imprisonment. See id. at ch. 5, pt. A..
80 For example, the Sentencing Commission had already convened an ad hoc
advisory group to examine the organizational sentencing guidelines. See Press
Release, United States Sentencing Commission, Sentencing Commission Convenes
Organizational Guidelines Ad Hoc Advisory Group (Feb. 21, 2002), at
http://www.ussc.gov/PRESS/rel0202.htm.
81 See Eide, supra note 13, at 360 (reviewing literature and noting "that in some
studies the effect of an increase in the severity of punishment is not statistically
different from zero, and a statistically positive effect has also occasionally been
obtained").
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that individuals either discount the future disutility of
imprisonment or that initial imprisonment is associated with the
greatest amount of disutility as compared to future years in
prison. That disutility might decline over time makes some
sense-"stigmatization of the prisoner (which lowers earning
capacity and status) may be primarily due to having been in
prison at all, and it may not increase much with the number of
years spent there." 2 Indeed, stigmatization occurs even earlier,
with wall-to-wall press coverage and the ritual "perp walk."
With respect to white-collar criminals, extra-criminal justice
penalties associated with loss of future economic earning power
may be particularly severe. One study found that "the highest
income criminals suffer reductions in legitimate income of
between eighty and ninety-five percent as a result of
conviction."8 3 Similarly, if potential white-collar defendants
systematically underestimate the disutility of prison, increasing
84
sentence length may not yield large decreases in deterrence.
Although popular stories about "Club Fed" may be inaccurate,8 5
the prevalence of those accounts may fuel misperceptions that
imprisonment, even if imposed, may not be too onerous.
As a result, longer sentences do not appear to be the answer
to deterring securities fraud. Harsher sentences may sell well in
elections, but they appear unlikely to have large deterrence
benefits. That is not to say that we should rely exclusively on
civil penalties as a deterrence strategy. There is clearly a role
for criminal enforcement in the federal securities markets. For
example, fines will be inadequate to deter fraudulent activity
where the optimal fine exceeds the defendant's ability to pay.
Under those circumstances, imprisonment can increase the
punishment sufficiently to create effective deterrence.8 6 It is
precisely because criminal sanctions have such a powerful
82 A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, On the Disutility and Discounting of
Imprisonment and the Theory of Deterrence, 28 J. LEG. STUD. 1, 3 (1999). See
generally Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming White-Collar Criminals:A
Proposal for Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J. L. & ECON. 365
(1999); J.R. Lott, Jr., Do We Punish High Income Criminals Too Heavily?, 30 ECON.
INQUIRY 583 (1992).
83 John R. Lott, Jr., Optimal Penalties Versus Minimizing the Level of Crime:
Does It Matter Who Is Correct?,71 B.U. L. REV. 439, 442 (1991).
84 Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 82, at 13.
85 Russ Mitchell, White-Collar Criminal?Pack Lightly for Prison, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 11, 2002, § 3, at 4.
86 POSNER, supra note 14, at 222.
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impact on reputation and future earnings capacity that they
should be part of the deterrence toolkit. The important point to
remember is that longer jail times, like most simple solutions,
are inadequate.
III. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN PRIVATE SECURITIES ACTIONS
While new crimes and. enhanced penalties have captured
most public and press attention, it is possible to increase
deterrence by increasing the likelihood that private parties will
bring successful securities fraud actions or by increasing the
damages available in such suits. Such an approach, however,
would amount to a significant about-face for Congress, which in
1995 passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (the
"PSLRA")8 7 to address perceived abuses in securities class
actions.88 Although several commentators suggested rolling back
provisions of the PSLRA, in the end, Congress changed only one
aspect of private securities fraud suits-section 804 lengthens
the statute of limitations for certain claims under the federal
securities laws. Specifically, the SOA amends 28 U.S.C. § 1658
to provide that private rights of action under the federal
securities laws involving "fraud, deceit, manipulation, or
contrivance" be brought not later than the earlier of two years
after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation or five
years after the violation.8 9
87

Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 15

U.S.C.).
88 See MICHAEL A. PERINO, SECURITIES LITIGATION AFTER THE REFORM ACT
1013-14 (2000).
89 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 804(b). In 1991, the United States Supreme Court in
Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991),
determined that the statute of limitations for Rule 10b-5 actions is one year after
the discovery of the facts constituting the violation and within three years after
such violation-the same limitation period that applies to several express causes of
action in the Exchange Act and the Securities Act. Id. at 364. Prior to Lampf, most
courts borrowed limitations periods from state law, creating a patchwork of
inconsistent limitation periods in Rule 10b-5 actions ranging from one to ten years.
10 LOUIS Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 4506 (3d ed., 1999).
Lampf adopted a uniform limitations period to eliminate these inconsistencies, to
reduce forum shopping, and to avoid "complex and expensive litigation over what
should be a straightforward matter." Lampf, 501 U.S. at 357 (quoting Agency
Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 154 (1987)). The Lampf
Court adopted the one-three year rule used elsewhere in the Exchange Act because
it could "imagine no clearer indication of how Congress would have balanced the
policy considerations implicit in any limitations provision than the balance struck
by the same Congress in limiting similar and related provisions." Id. at 359.
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The rationale Congress offered for extending the statute of
limitations is that a longer period will permit defrauded
investors a greater opportunity to recoup losses in cases where
those perpetrating the fraud have concealed it.90 In deterrence
terms, a longer statute of limitations theoretically makes it
somewhat more likely that investors (or, more accurately,
lawyers) will detect improper behavior, assuming that such
behavior is difficult to conceal for long periods. Whether a longer
statute of limitations will achieve positive deterrence benefits is
then an empirical question. Under the old statute of limitations,
were potential defendants able to externalize part of the cost of
fraudulent activity because they were able to conceal those
frauds?
As I have argued elsewhere, 91 there is little empirical
evidence supporting an increase in the statute of limitations. In
fact, when passing the PSLRA seven years ago Congress
expressed exactly the opposite concern-it found that actions
were often brought too quickly with little apparent pre-filing
92
investigation.
In connection with a recently completed study of the
effectiveness of the PSLRA, 93 I have examined in detail a sample
of 160 securities fraud class actions filed from July 1998 through
June 2001. Of those cases, 146 involved the kind of Rule 10b-5
actions that appear to be the primary focus of the SOA. On
average, these cases were brought within fifty-five days of the
end of the class period, i.e., the time when the alleged
misrepresentation or omission was disclosed. Median filing time
in the cases was even shorter-just eleven days. As Figure 1
demonstrates, 89% of the actions in the sample were filed within
six months of disclosure of the alleged misconduct. Only 4.79%
of the cases studied were brought within three days of the oneyear limit.

90 148 CONG. REC. S6437 (daily ed. July 9, 2002) (statement of Sen. Daschle).
91 See Michael A. Perino, Statutes of Limitations Under the Newly Passed
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 2, 2002, at 4.
92 S. REP. No. 104-98, at 8 (1995) ("A complaint alleging violations of the
Federal securities laws is easy to craft and can be filed with little or no due
diligence.").
93 Perino, supra note 10.
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Figure 1
Time to Filing in Securities Class Actions
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This evidence demonstrates that plaintiffs' lawyers, the
driving force behind this type of litigation, are more than capable
of bringing actions within a year of discovery. Indeed, in both
Enron and WorldCom, class actions were brought within days of
the company's accounting restatements. 94 This incentive to
investigate and file actions quickly is not derived from fear that
a limitations period will run; rather, it is because earlier filings
appear to give attorneys a competitive advantage in securing the
95
lucrative lead counsel position.
In fact, the one-year discovery rule already addresses the
problem of fraudulent concealment that Congress purported to
address-the time period does not begin to run until the plaintiff
discovered or should have discovered through reasonable
diligence the facts necessary to assert a claim.9 6 In a fraud case,
the time period does not begin to run until the plaintiff knows or
should know that the defendant made a knowingly false
misrepresentation or omission. 97 There is simply no empirical or
legal basis for altering the one-year discovery rule.
94 See Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLP Commences a Class Action
Litigation Against WorldCom, Inc., Bernard J. Ebbers, Scott D. Sullivan, And
Arthur Anderson, LLP, PR NEWSWIRE, JUNE 27, 2002; Milberg Weiss Announces
ClassAction Suit Against Enron Corp., BUSINESS WIRE, Oct. 22, 2001.
95 See Perino, supra note 10.
96 See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350,
363 (1991); see also Law v. Medco Research, Inc., 113 F.3d 781, 785-86 (7th Cir.
1997).
97 Law, 113 F.3d at 786.
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There is also little support for lengthening the three-year
statute of repose to five years. There is little or no evidence of
completed frauds that only came to light after the three-year
period had run. Nonetheless, even if plaintiffs can commence
actions quickly after discovery, it is possible that a three-year
limit might cut-off some potential recovery in a fraud that
existed for a significant amount of time.
From a policy perspective then, the relevant empirical
question concerns the frequency of such long-term frauds.
98
Longer-term frauds have received significant press coverage
but also appear to be relatively infrequent. One way to analyze
this issue is to look at the class periods alleged in securities
fraud complaints since the class period typically starts when the
fraud allegedly commences. If such frauds were prevalent, we
should expect to see a significant number of class periods that
approach three years in length. The data reveal no such pattern.
The average class period in the actions studied is about 243
days, a little over eight months. Median class periods are an
even shorter 199 days, just over six months. Less than 3% of the
actions studied involved class periods longer than 2.5 years.
Even if long-term frauds are relatively rare, one might ask
what the harm is in extending the statute of limitations to five
years?
To be sure, such an extension might assist some
investors who have been harmed by long-term frauds, but it will
also likely impose significant costs on our capital markets as
well. When Congress passed the PSLRA it was concerned with
the problem of non-meritorious class actions brought for their
settlement value. While the PSLRA has given defendants
significant tools to fight non-meritorious cases, these cases have
not been completely eliminated. Corporations may still have
strong incentives to settle such cases, in part because of the large
theoretical damages generated in open-market securities fraud
cases and the reluctance of defendants to risk an adverse jury
verdict that could potentially bankrupt the company. Extending
the statute of limitations increases this settlement pressure
because it creates even larger theoretical damages. These error
99
costs also reduce deterrence and decrease social welfare.
98 See Barnaby J. Feder & Seth Schiesel, WorldCom Finds $3.3 Billion More in
Irregularities,N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 9, 2002, at Al (reporting accounting irregularities

dating back to 1999).
99 Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 13, at 318.
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Even if a longer limitations period were warranted, the
provision is poorly drafted. It is inconsistent with express
statutes of limitation already contained in the federal securities
laws and is likely to create significant interpretational
difficulties for courts.
Although the drafters' primary aim appears to be to extend
the statute of limitations for Rule 10b-5 actions, the SOA has a
much broader effect because it applies to all causes of action
under the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. There are a
number of express private rights of action in those statutes, each
of which is already governed by an explicit statute of limitations.
The new limitations period does not contain an exception for acts
of Congress with their own limitations periods. 10 0 Thus, if one of
the express causes of action involves a claim of fraud, deceit,
manipulation, or contrivance, two statutes of limitations will
apply to it-the express provision of the federal securities laws
and 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b). This appears to be the case for at least
three provisions of the Exchange Act: (1) manipulation claims
under section 9(e); 10 1 (2) misleading statement claims under
section 18;102 and (3) certain insider trading claims under section
20A.103
The SOA may also present significant problems for causes of
action that do not require proof of scienter. For example, claims
under sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act do not
require that the plaintiff prove fraud, but a number of courts
have found that such claims may still "sound in fraud."10 4 Courts
applying the SOA may have to determine whether these claims
sound in fraud before determining the appropriate limitations
period to apply. Thus, different claims under the same express
liability provisions may be governed by different statutes of
limitations.
Different courts are likely to reach different

100See Lampf, 501 U.S. at 364 n.10.
101 See 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (2000) (manipulation claims must be brought within

one year after the discovery and within three years after violation).
102 See id. 78r(c) (2000) (claims for false or misleading SEC filings must be

brought within one year after discovery and within three years after cause of action
accrued).
103 See id. § 78t-l(b)(4) (contemporaneous insider trading claims may not be
brought more than five years after the date of the last transaction that is the subject

of the violation).
104 See, e.g., Anderson v. Clow, 89 F.3d 1399, 1405 (9th Cir. 1996); Shaw v.
Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1223 (1st Cir. 1996).
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conclusions on this issue, thereby creating uncertainty for
potential plaintiffs and defendants as to the viability of a
particular claim. Such inconsistencies may encourage forum
shopping and increase the costs of securities fraud actions as
litigants clash over whether the limitations period has runprecisely the kinds of problems the Supreme Court sought to
10 5
avoid when it adopted a uniform limitations period.
IV. STRENGTHENING THE COP ON THE BEAT:
COMMISSION RESOURCES AND AUTHORITY

For years the SEC has been on a starvation diet. The SEC
(with a staff of about 3,000) oversees nine national securities
exchanges, the over-the-counter market, seventy alternative
trading systems, twelve registered clearing agencies, 8,000
registered broker-dealers that employ over 700,000 registered
representatives, 8,000 transfer agents, 5,000 investment
companies, 7,400 investment advisers, and 14,000 issuers. 10 6
Throughout the 1990s, as the securities markets became larger,
more complex, and increasingly global, the SEC's resources
lagged increasingly farther behind its workload. For example,
from 1990 through 2000 the SEC's enforcement staff grew by
16% while the number of complaints grew 100%.107
The
percentage of corporate filings that received a full or partial
review dropped from 21% percent in 1990 to 8% in 2000.108 The
SEC has also been hampered by substantial staff turnover,
driven in part by large pay differentials between the SEC and
other financial regulators. Although President Bush signed a
pay-parity law to address these concerns, 10 9 his initial 2003
budget did not fund it.
The SOA seeks to reverse this trend.
It significantly
increases the SEC's resources, increasing SEC appropriations for
fiscal year 2003 to $776 million, a 66% percent increase from the
$466.9 million in President Bush's original budget proposal.
About 30% of that increase is earmarked to add 200 employees
105See Lampf, 501 U.S. at 357.
106 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. NO. GAO-02-302,

SEC OPERATIONS:

INCREASED WORKLOAD CREATES CHALLENGES 3 (March 2002).
107 Id. at 13.
108 Id. at 22.

109 Investor and Capital Markets Fee Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 107-123, 115 Stat.

2390 (2002) (to be codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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for auditor oversight and to improve the SEC's "investigative
and disciplinary effort[s]."11° Another third is slated to raise the
pay of SEC employees to levels commensurate with other
financial regulators."'
Even with these funding increases, the SEC is likely to be
resource-constrained over the short-term. It will take some time
to add and train new staff. The SOA gives the SEC substantial
112
rulemaking responsibilities over the course of the next year.
The SOA also directs the SEC to review publicly traded issuers'
periodic disclosures "on a regular and systematic basis for the
protection of investors."" 3
Still, these budget increases, if
maintained in the future, may well provide more substantial
deterrence than the more publicized criminal provisions of the
SOA.
A large body of empirical literature suggests that
increasing the risk of detecting crimes (which is primarily what
this budget increased does) has a more substantial deterrent
14
effect than increasing sanctions."
The SOA not only increases the SEC budget, it also
110 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 601 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78kk).
111 The SEC is to use the remaining increase for technology and security
enhancements and for expenses related to September 11th.
112 The Act also directs the SEC to undertake a number of studies. The
Commission is required to study: (i) its enforcement actions over the preceding five
years that have included civil penalties or disgorgement "to identify areas where
such proceedings may be utilized to efficiently, effectively, and fairly provide
restitution for injured investors," id. § 308(c)(1)(A), (ii) "the role and function of
credit rating agencies," id. § 702, (iii) securities law violations among professionals
practicing before the Commission for the period 1998 to 2001, id. § 703, (iv) all
enforcement actions over the previous five years "to identify areas of reporting that
are most susceptible to fraud, inappropriate manipulation, or inappropriate
earnings management," id. § 704, (v) the extent that issuers use off-balance sheet
transactions and special purpose entities and whether current GAAP rules make
the accounting for such transactions sufficiently transparent, id. § 401(c), and (vi)
whether it is appropriate for the United States to adopt a principles-based
accounting system, id. § 108(d)(1)(a).
113 Id. § 408(a) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7266). At a minimum, the SEC is
required to review an issuer's filings at least once every three years. Id. § 408(c). In
scheduling reviews, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act directs the SEC to consider, among
other factors, whether the issuer: (i) issued a material restatement; (ii) has
significant stock price volatility; (iii) has a large market capitalization; (iv) is an
emerging company with a disparity in price to earnings ratio; and (v) is in a
material sector of the economy. Id. § 408(b).
114 See JAMES Q. WILSON & RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN, CRIME AND HUMAN
NATURE 398 (1985); Eide, supra note 13, at 359; Jeffrey Grogger, Certainty vs.
Severity of Punishment, 29 ECON. INQUIRY 297, 304 (1991). See generally Isaac
Ehrlich, Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical and Empirical
Investigation, 81 J. POL. ECON. 521 (1973).
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enhances the enforcement tools at the SEC's disposal. These
provisions are important for deterrence to the extent that they
increase the probability of a successful enforcement action and
increase the loss if caught (and therefore the severity of the
punishment). 115 The most significant enforcement change for
officers and directors is the expansion of the SEC's authority to
bar individuals from serving as officers and directors of reporting
companies if those individuals have violated section 17(a)(1) of
the Securities Act or section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.
Previously, the SEC could only obtain so-called O&D bars in a
federal court action by showing that the person was
"substantially unfit" to serve as an officer or director. 116 The
SOA amends this standard from "substantial unfitness" to
"unfitness. 1 17 This change flowed from SEC arguments "that
the 'substantial unfitness' standard for imposing bars is
inordinately high, causing courts to refrain from imposing bars
even in cases of egregious misconduct." 1 8
It remains to be seen how courts will interpret this
provision. Most courts interpreting the "substantial unfitness"
standard followed the six-factor analysis established in SEC v.
Patel.119 Courts have most frequently focused on the likelihood
of recurrence as the determining factor in granting or denying
the bar order. 120 Even under an "unfitness" standard, courts are
115 PYLE, supra note 16, at 13.
116 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(e), 78u(d)(2) (2000).
117 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 305.
118 See SEC v. Patel, 61 F.3d 137, 141

(2d Cir. 1995) (reversing district court
imposition of bar order because SEC had not sufficiently demonstrated likelihood of
future misconduct).
119 Patel, 61 F.3d at 141. The Patel court held that the court should consider:
"(1) the 'egregiousness' of the underlying securities law violation; (2) the defendant's
'repeat offender' status; (3) the defendant's 'role' or position when he engaged in the
fraud; (4) the defendant's degree of scienter; (5) the defendant's economic stake in
the violation; and (6) the likelihood that misconduct will recur." Id. (quoting Jayne
W. Barnard, When Is a Corporate Executive "SubstantiallyUnfit to Serve"?, 70 N.C.
L. REV. 1489, 1492-93 (1992)).
120 See, e.g., SEC v. First Pac. Bancorp, 142 F.3d 1186, 1193-94 (9th Cir. 1998)
(affirming bar order against recidivist defendant); Patel,61 F.3d at 142 (suggesting
that "loss of livelihood and the stigma attached to permanent exclusion from the
corporate suite" should in most cases require substantial evidence before imposing
permanent bar); SEC v. Posner, 16 F.3d 520, 521-22 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding bar
order appropriate because defendants' "'high degree of scienter' and... past
securities law violations.., demonstrated that such violations were likely to
continue"); SEC v. Chester Holdings, Ltd., 41 F. Supp. 2d 505, 530 (D.N.J. 1999)
(permanently barring defendant who had "been restrained, censured, fined, and
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likely to continue to insist on a showing of potential future
violations.
Any such continuing reluctance may make very little
practical difference to the SEC because section 1105 of the SOA
now permits the SEC to impose O&D bars in cease-and-desist
proceedings under sections 8A of the Securities Act 12 1 and 21C of
the Exchange Act. 1 22 Thus, the SEC may now obtain O&D bars
in administrative actions without a federal court order. Ceaseand-desist proceedings employ the same "unfitness" standard as
court actions, 123 but the SEC is not typically required to show
124
likelihood of repetition in cease-and-desist proceedings.
As a result, it is reasonable to expect more frequent
imposition of such bars, 125 although it is unclear how much
additional deterrence such orders provide.
For example,
consider the most recent high profile bar order involving Al
Dunlap, formerly Chairman of Sunbeam Corporation.
Mr.
Dunlap acquired a reputation as an effective, if brutal, leader of
troubled companies, earning him the sobriquet "Chainsaw Al."
That reputation suffered substantially when he was implicated
in the accounting scandal at Sunbeam and when media reports
linked him to other similar accounting scandals earlier in his
career. 126 While the SEC's bar order officially closes the door on
Mr. Dunlap's colorful career, was it terribly likely that he was
going to serve as an officer and director of a publicly traded
company in the future? If such service were unlikely, does
prohibiting it create much deterrence for future officers bent on
fraud? It is certainly possible that a well-publicized O&D bar
might impose additional reputational loss, but the real benefit of
the bar seems to be in preventing the particular wrongdoer from
committing additional acts-precisely the standard courts used
in reviewing request for such relief.
even imprisoned for prior securities violations").
121 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 1105(b) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3).
122 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 1105(a) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1).
123 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h-1, 78u-3 (2000).
124 See 10 Loss & SELIGMAN, supranote 89, at 4989.
125 Even prior to passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the SEC increasingly
sought bar orders in its actions. See Michael Schroeder, Dunlap Settles Fraud
Charges With the SEC, WALL ST. J., Sept. 5, 2002, at C14 (noting that in this fiscal
year, SEC has sought 93 bar orders, almost twice as many as it sought in fiscal year
2001).
126 See Floyd Norris, An Executive's Missing Years: Papering over Past
Problems, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2001, at Al.
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In any event, although one may raise questions about the
legitimate scope of SEC enforcement powers, it is certain that
the SEC has its work cut out for it. While it has been given
substantial additional resources, it has also been given
It also has an enormous
substantial new responsibilities.
amount of rulemaking to accomplish in a relatively short time.
Nonetheless, the increase in SEC resources and enforcement
authority may prove to be one of the most important changes
that the SOA makes.
CONCLUSION

Congress said it was getting tough on corporate crime when
it passed the SOA. It trumpeted its new crimes and new
enhanced penalties as providing significant deterrence for
securities fraud. In reality, these provisions are unlikely to have
They criminalize little
much real impact on deterrence.
additional conduct and do little to enhance real penalties. Even
if they did meaningfully increase penalties, economic literature
suggests that such increases have comparatively little impact on
increasing deterrence.
Likewise, the lengthened statute of
limitations creates an enhanced detection risk, but empirical
data suggest that the previous limitations periods were
sufficient. Far more significant than these reforms are the
increased resources and enforcement authority at the SEC. In
particular, the increased enforcement resources (especially if
maintained in the future) may significantly increase the
likelihood that securities fraud is detected. Increasing detection
may well have a much greater long-term impact on deterrence
than enhanced penalties.

